Window on Eurasia

Kremlin Official Says ‘No Pro-Russian Forces’ Exist in Post-Soviet States

Paul Goble

Vienna, July 5, 2006 – Modest Kolerov, who serves as President Vladimir
Putin’s senior advisor on cultural ties with foreign countries, says
that “there are no pro-Russian forces” in post-Soviet states and
that most Russians posing as experts on these countries are more
interested in telling them what to do than in finding out what is going
on in them.

Kolerov, whose functions in the Presidential Administration
specifically include “the defense of the rights of Russian citizens and
compatriots in the post-Soviet states” made these remarks in a June 29 speech to Moscow’s Bilingua Café that was posted online yesterday
[http://www.polit.ru/lectures/2006/07/04/kolerov.html].

Asked to speak about “what we know” concerning the post-Soviet
states, the Kremlin advisor said that he was tempted to say “we know
nothing,” a “provocative” response to a “provocative”
question but one that he suggested contained “not a little” of the truth
about Moscow’s understanding of its neighbors.

There are many reasons for that, he continued, but among the most
important is the fact that these so-called students of these countreis
“conceive themselves not as experts [who must observe and gather
information] but instead as spiritual leaders who must bring some truth
or other” to one or another of these countries.

On many questions, Kolersov added, he had discovered since assuming his
current post that there is no information available on these countries
or that the data that do exist are poorly presented and analyzed. And
on the basis of his own experience and reflections, he listed 12 theses
that he said described the contours of post-Soviet realities:

His first thesis about the former Soviet republics is that as a group,
they will be able to come together on a voluntary basis only after each
and every one of them feels itself completely indepdent and capable of
acting on its one. Any effort to force that development will almost
certainly backfire.

Kolerov’s second these is that the post-Soviet states divide on the
basis of their independence and sovereignty. Some claimed it through
their own efforts, while others got it as a result of international
recognition. If the first should speak of “we the people,” he said,
the second should say only that “they permitted it.”

His third thesis is that whatever people in Moscow may hope, there are
now “no pro-Russian forces in the post-Soviet space.” Those who
offer themselves as candidates for this role are “marginal figures”
who will not be likely to play any significant role in the immediate
future.

His fourth thesis is that Moscow officials must understand that
nationalism is the predominant ideology in all the post-Soviet
countries except for the Russian Federation. And his fifth thesis is that rising
military expenditures by many of these countries, the post-Soviet space
is becoming “a zone of rapid and intensive militarization.”

Kolerov’s sixth thesis is that throughout this region, the secret
services and intelligence agencies have emerged as “active political
players,” whose power has been sufficient to promote a change of
government in Lithuania and to push policy changes elsewhere.

His seventh thesis is that over the last 16 years, the societies of the
post-Soviet states have been completely de-internationalized, that is,
they have ceased to view Russian as the language of interethnic
communication and have ceased to focus on promoting good relations
among ethnic groups.

Kolerov’s eighth thesis is that in the post-Soviet countries,
clan-based economics and clan-based politics are even more marked than
in the Russian Federation itself, a situation he stresses that is true
even among those who are already members of the European Union or who
hope to join that grouping in the future.

His ninth thesis is that the international community needs to focus on
the fact that all the post-Soviet states except for Russia are unitary
states and thus the appointment of governors and other things the West
complains about in the case of Moscow are things it should be upset
about elsewhere.

His 10th thesis is that political parties are extremely weak and
embryonic in all post-Soviet states, with most of them “constructed
according to the fuhrer-principle or along clan or mafia lines.”

AndKolerov’s 11th is that economic competition among these states and
between them in Russia is increasing and will likely continue to do so.

Finally, Kolerov’s 12th thesis is that however independent-minded the
leaderships of the post-Soviet states are, they are still linked
together in a dependency relationship with the Russian Federation
either because of transit issues or longstanding economic ties that are
unlikely to end anytime soon.

Not surprisingly Kolerov’s remarks provoked a lively discussion, with
many of the participants dissenting from one or another of his theses.
But Kolerov held his own, and although he acknowledged in response to
questions that the specific theses he had advanced were his own, he
said that most reflect “a consensus” among Kremlin leaders.

That remark suggests that his ideas, regardless of whether they are
true or whether other commentators or officials agree with them, are likely
at least in the near future to play a significant role in defining how
Moscow will view its neighbors and what policies the Russian government
will adopt toward them.