Window on Eurasia

Russia Said Putting Itself at Risk of Becoming a Second Serbia

Paul Goble

Vienna, June 22, 2006 – The Russian Federation risks transforming itself into a second Serbia if it moves to incorporate one or more of the so-called “unrecognized states,” a step that would not only isolate
Moscow internationally but threaten the territorial integrity of the country itself, according to a leading Moscow analyst.

In 1991, Sergei Markedonov writes in an article posted on the
Politcom.ru site yesterday, the Russian government decided to insist
that the international community and its own population recognize the
administrative borders inherited from Soviet times as the new
international borders
[http://www.politcom.ru/article.php?id=2934].

Doing so infuriated many Russian nationalists who felt that Moscow had
a strong claim on the basis of ethnicity and the principle of national
self-determination to eastern Ukraine, northern Kazakhstan and portions
of other former Soviet republics, Markedonov notes, but the decision to
do so saved the country.

It meant, the Moscow analyst continues, that Russia was not drawn into
“a total war along the entire perimeter of its borders,” a conflict
that in those circumstances would have led to its isolation and defeat
and possibly contributed to the disintegration of the Russian
Federation as a single state.

The dangers of such a step, he suggests, are reflected in the very
different decision of the leaders of Serbia following the collapse of
Yugoslavia. With the demise of that multi-national state, Belgrade
decided to insist on “a radical revision of the borders of the former
republics.”

As a result of that decision, one taken without a clear-minded
assessment of Belgrade’s possibilities, “’Greater Serbia’ not
only could not become the nucleus of a new Yugoslavia but also lost
control of such historically connected territories as Kosovo and lost
the opportunity to defend the rights of the Serbian population”
elsewhere.

Unfortunately, Markedonov continues, having avoided a similar mistake
15 years ago, some Russian politicians are in danger of making it now.
They include those who believe that Moscow should back the independence of
the so-called “unrecognized states” in the CIS and incorporate one
or more of them within the Russian Federation.

Such a step, he warns, would be a disaster in three ways. First, it
would be extremely expensive financially, something “practically no
one” in the Russian Federation is thinking about just now, and would
embroil Moscow still further in conflicts it should seek to avoid.

Second, it would isolate Moscow internationally by suggesting that
Russia is now a revisionist state, one that wants to revisit the
borders that the international community now recognizes and that like the moves
of Belgrade in the past threatens stability across an enormous region
of the world.

And third, any move to change borders on the basis of the principle of
national self-determination he says could quickly backfire on the
Russian Federation, where not only the Chechens but other non-Russian
groups could insist on the same right. Were that to happen, the Russian
Federation might degenerate into violence and collapse.

One reason many Russian politicians and analysts now believe that
Moscow can move to incorporate some of these states is because of what is
happening in the former Yugoslavia, Markedonov notes. These people
suggest that the West’s efforts to raise the status of Kosovo means
that Moscow can do the same for the “non-recognized states.”

But that is a dangerous misreading of the situation, Markedonov argues.
For too long, he suggests, many Russians have considered what happens
in Yugoslavia as a model for what will, can or should happen in their own
country, but they have seldom considered the entire dimensions of what
is taking place in either place.

Belgrade is losing Kosovo, he argues, precisely because Slobodan
Milosevic and other Serbian politicians earlier adopted the policies
that the Russian advocates of the inclusion of one or more of the
“unrecognized states” want to see Moscow adopt now – and for no
other reason.

And consequently, if Russia is to avoid a similar disaster, Markedonov
says, it must stop looking to Yugoslavia as a model and pursue its own
“egocentric policy” on the territory of the Commonwealth of
Independent States (CIS), a policy that will enhance Russia’s
position as a state rather than threaten it.

In short, the longtime specialist on ethnic issues and national
security says, Russia must and easily can avoid what he calls
“’Serbianization’ with all the ensuring consequences” by not
allowing itself to fall into the same trap that Belgrade did more than
15 years ago.

Markedonov’s argument for Moscow to take a cautious approach to any
change in its policy toward the “unrecognized states” is likely to
be persuasive in many quarters, but his suggestion that Russians should
stop thinking about their own country in terms of what happens in the
former Yugoslavia is unlikely to be heeded by many.

Not only do many Russian nationalist sites continue to focus on
Yugoslav events, but today Moscow’s “Sovetskaya Rossiya” published an
article asking “Does a Russian Kosovo Threaten Us?” about the
impact of the rise of the Muslim community on the future of the Russian
Federation
[http://www.sovross.ru/2006/59/59_3_1.htm].