Window on Eurasia

Weakness of Russian Nationalists Reflects Their Statist Approach

Paul Goble

Vienna, June 20, 2006 – Russian nationalists have failed to win a large following not because they have incorrectly identified the grievances
many ethnic Russians feel but rather because the prescriptions they
offer, almost all of which require the state rather than the people to
act, are alien to the traditions of the Russian people themselves.

That sweeping judgment about the failure of Russian nationalism to take
off after the collapse of the Soviet Union was offered yesterday by
Moscow analyst Aleksandr Yershov on the basis of his examination of the
intense Internet-based debates between “Russian nationalists” and
“Soviet patriots”
[http://www.apn.ru/opinions/print9871.htm].

The two groups, which form the core of what many now call the
“patriotic camp,” are very different, Yershov says. Russian
nationalists, he notes, believe that “’the interests of the Russian
people are above all others,” while Soviet patriots are attracted by
“super-national ideas” as reflected in “an empire.”

The squabbles between the two have produced “a Niagara of words,”
the Moscow analyst notes, most of which are of interest only to those
taking part in these discussions. But he suggests that this debate does
provide some important clues as to why Russian nationalists have failed
to win over a significant portion of the population.

According to Yerzhov, “the nationalists justly consider the problems
of Russians and correctly see the roots of these problems in the Soviet
past. And there is a great deal of wisdom in criticism by the
nationalists of the contemporary state structure of the Russian
Federation.”

Indeed, given the current situation in the Russian Federation, Yerzhov
insists, one would reasonably expect them to be a far greater force in
Russian politics than they are. The reasons for that failure are to be
found in “the methods by which the nationalists propose to solve
these shortcomings in contemporary Russian reality.”

Among the “solutions” that Russian nationalists most frequently
propose are deportations, closing of borders, and the introduction of
“collective responsibility” as a principle of law. Such ideas,
however one views any of them, are “outside the framework of the
historically evolved Russian traditions of solving national
questions.”

On the one hand, Yerzhov argues, “the Russian people always was the
strongest people in its own state and practically never (with rare
exceptions) found itself forced to defend its own national rights
within the borders of its own country.” Thus, it did not have the same basis
for nationalism that many other peoples did.

And on the other, today’s Russian nationalists do not ask the Russian
people to take action on their own as other nationalist do. Instead,
they call on the government to solve all problems, an approach which is
“a constituent part namely of Soviet and not Russian traditional
understanding.”

In short, the Russian nationalists have failed to extend their critique
of the Soviet system’s impact on the Russian people far enough, and
as a result, they are seeking to employ -- albeit without acknowledging it
-- Soviet-era methods to solve problems that they quite rightly suggest
are the products of the Soviet-era itself.

This failing of contemporary Russian nationalists, Yerzhov writes,
becomes especially evident if one examines their overblown criticism of
the contemporary Russian state. First, Russian nationalists have
foolishly gotten caught up in a debate about the difference between
“russkiy” and “rossisskiy.”

Given that both Derzhavin and Pushkin used the latter, it is absurd to
suggest as many Russian nationalists today do that the non-ethnic
version of the term “bears within itself some Russophobic aspect.
Moreover, he points out, they should remember that until 1991, many
Russians designated themselves by the “pseudo-ethnonym
‘sovetskiy.’”

Second, Russian nationalists have failed to give the state credit for
how much it has done to rein in non-Russian groups in the country not
only by bringing the legislation of the national republics in line with
all-Russian laws but also by moving to eliminate some of the
non-Russian units altogether.

Third, Russian nationalists like to complain that Moscow has sacrificed
the interests of the Russian people in the North Caucasus, but that is
absurd, Yerzhov argues. Look at the ways in which the Russian military
has worked to supress the Chechens and other “militant
mountaineers.”

Fourth, illegal migration is the issue of choice for many Russian
nationalists at the moment, but even here, they typically forget, the
Moscow analyst says, that most of the information they have about this
phenomenon comes from a government that is also committed to opposing
it.

And fifth, the Russian nationalists typically pass over in silence the
extent to which the current Russian government has revived and even elevated the status of the Russian Orthodox Church not only at official
ceremonies but in schools and other public spaces in the country.

If Russian nationalists are to escape from their status as a small,
marginal grouping, they will have to stop spending so much time
brooding about what the state does or does not do and start focusing on the
organization of the Russian people “from below.”

Yerzhov insists “the traditional Russian path of resolving social
problems presupposes an initiatve from below.” While many would
disagree, he says that Koz’ma Minin during the time of troubles and
the Russians who gave money for the Cathedral of Christ the Saviour in
the 19th century point the way forward for Russian nationalism.

Such efforts in the past were critical to the salvation of the Russian
people, Yerzhov argues, but few contemporary Russian nationalists are
interested in them not only because they require a lot of effort but
also because most of them take a long time to realize.

But unless the Russian nationalists follow what Yerzhov calls “the
Russian path” of relying on the people rather than the state in
addressing Russian problems, this trend in Russian politics will remain
marginal at best -- and others including the Soviet patriots will play
a far greater role in defining the future of their country.