Window on Eurasia

Russia Said Heading Toward '1937 Light'

Paul Goble

Tallinn, June 13, 2006 – The recent wave of dismissals and retirements from the FSB, the Federation Council, and in the regions suggests that the Russian authorities are moving toward a „softer and smaller”
version of the purges of 1937 – something which might be called „1937
light,” according to one Russian nationalist author.

In an essay posted online last week, Aleksandr Khramchikhin argues that in Russia today everything is „light” – the country has
„dictatorship-light,” „ CPSU- light,” and a leader who is
either „Stalin-light” or „Brezhnev-light.” And thus one should not be
surprised that it will experience „’37-light” as well
[http://www.russ.ru/docs/120186299?mode=print].

Khramchikhin, who is a frequent and vitriolic critic of the Putin
regime from a Russian nationalist perspective, begins his remarks with a
discussion of what 1937 was about in order to be in a position to
outline the ways in which he believes the current situation is similar
and also very different.

1937 occupies a special place in Russian thought, Khramchikhin argues,
but it is important to understand the ways in which discussions about
what happened then have been used to distort popular understanding of the history of Russians and all the other peoples of the former Soviet
Union.

„The genocide of all the peoples of the country in its cruelly
repressive form continued practically without interruption from 1917 to
1953. The year 1937 is distinguished by the fact that for the first
them those who deserved to be arrested – the so-called ‚Leninist
guard’ – began to be put in prision.”

That development, he continues, was „doubly pleasing” because these
„enemies of the people – and the application of that term to them
is absolutely correct – suffered at the hands of their own creation.”
Those of that group who survived made that year into the symbol of all
repression but in fact it was the time when „the bosses began to
devour one another.”

In 1937, the Moscow analyst continues, those involved were struggling
for power. „But today, they are fighting for money. Not against
corruption, of course, but for a monopoly on corruption.” Those
involved neither want to lose their place at the trough – hence their
fears about what would happen if Putin left office – or to share the
spoils with each other.

But that is only one of the differences between „the squabbling
within the ruling group” in 1937 and the fights within it now. Seventy years ago, these fights actually had the effect „not of destroying the
regime but of strengthening” it. Stalin not only had „a colossal
instinct for power” – money meant nothing to him – but led an
elite united by an idea.

Now, there is no such leader with „a will to power” and no such
unifying idea – imagine, Khramchikhin writes of someone who would go
into battle „’for sovereign democracy’.” Instead, „there are
only financial interests.” And that makes the current battle far more
dangerous for the regime’s stability.

Because financial interests are the only thing that matter, he writes,
those who stand lower down in the hierarchy hate those „above
them.” And consequently, „the destruction of the system of the balance of interests, of checks and balances, fo real political competition [under
Putin] has made the state much weaker and less stable than it was in
the 1990s.”

That in turn means that the activity of the force structures could
prove especially destructive because „their victory would lead to the
defeat of a most powerful and effective propagand machine of the current regime and also could force Putin to serve a third term against its will” and by so doing, make him „illegitimate.”

And finally it means that „a too active struggle with corruption”
could lead to the complete disintegration of the country, especially
considering how angry at the center are not only regional elites but
also a very significant portion of the population, especially in the
Caucasus, in Siberia, and in the Far East.”

Given all that, Khramchikhin concludes, „the situation in many
respects is an ideal one for the self-organization of society from
below.” On the one hand, to the extent that the bosses are fighting
among themselves, they have less time to attend to the population below them.

And on the other, the members of the current elite – who must be
either thieves, „absolute cynics,” or people with „limited mental
abilities – might prove to be completely incapable of resisting a
genuine and well-organized challenge from below. And those in the elite
must know that.

„It is difficult to recall a time in Russian history when there was a
gorup in power that so openly ignored the interests of the country,”
Khramchikhin writes, and consequently, the nation’s „instinct for
self-preservation „ should soon kick in. If that does not happen,
then „the bosses are right, the people of Russia have truly become a
nation of sheep.”